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I. INTRODUCTION

In short order—from initial indictment to jury conviction between
summer and fall of 2008—a federal corruption case against Alaska’s
beloved U.S. Senator Ted Stevens brought swift end to a long and
industrious political career.1 In a horrendous abuse of public trust, Stevens
had accepted gifts from an oil service corporation and its CEO in aggregate
worth of over $250,000 in seven years, primarily in the form of renovations
to his Girdwood, Alaska ski resort community “chalet.”2 Known to his
constituents as “Uncle Ted,” the 84-year-old World War II veteran who was
serving his sixth full term, the longest-serving Republican in U.S. Senate
history,3 had deviously avoided paying for the “things of value” then further
disregarded the integrity of the office he held by intentionally failing to
acknowledge the gifts on his financial disclosure forms—as expressly
required under the Ethics in Government Act (EIGA).4 In concealing the
gifts, his corrupt conduct amounted to misrepresentation in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001, and he was charged with seven counts of making false
statements.5 “Like any other criminal defendant, Senator Stevens is
presumed innocent unless and until he is proven guilty in a court of law,”
promised Matthew Friedrich, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the U.S.
Department of Justice Criminal Division on the day of Stevens’s
indictment.6
And proven guilty in a court of law, he was.7 Three months after his
1
See Jeffrey Toobin, Casualties of Justice, NEW YORKER, Jan. 3, 2011, at 39, available at
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/03/casualties-of-justice; see also Gail Russell Chaddock,
Ted Stevens Plane Crash: How ‘Uncle Ted’ Reshaped Alaska, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, (Aug. 10,
2010),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0810/Ted-Stevens-plane-crash-how-Uncle-Tedreshaped-Alaska (explaining that Ted Stevens, known as “Alaskan of the Century” and “Uncle Ted,” and
who had been present when the U.S. Senate voted for Alaska’s statehood, had worked as a staunch
advocate on behalf of Alaska for over 40 years, bringing major projects and funding to the 49th State,
even helping it to consistently and notoriously claim the No. 1 “pork per capita” state ranking).
2
Indictment ¶¶ 15, 26, 27 United States v. Stevens, No. 08CR00231, 2008 WL 2894791 (D.D.C.
July 29, 2008) [hereinafter Stevens Indictment]; Linton Weeks & Pam Fessler, Q&A: Inside The
Indictment of Ted Stevens, NPR (July 29, 2008, 5:19 PM), http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=93045719.
3
See Chaddock, supra note 1; Weeks & Fessler, supra note 2; see also Aaron Blake, Begich’s
Entry Tees Up First Tough Reelection Race in Stevens’ Career, THE HILL (Feb. 27, 2008, 7:11 PM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/campaign/1137-begichs-entry-tees-up-first-tough-reelection-race-instevenss-career.
4
Stevens Indictment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 8, 9.
5
See generally Stevens Indictment, supra note 2 (describing all seven counts against Stevens).
6
Matthew Friedrich, Acting Ass’t. Att’y Gen., Press Conference on Indictment of U.S. Senator
(July 29, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/2008/07/07-2908_pressconference.pdf).
7
See Neil A. Lewis, Alaska Senator Is Guilty Over His Failures to Disclose Gifts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
28, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/washington/28stevens
.html?pagewanted=all.
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indictment, the District of Columbia jury of his peers returned the verdict;
upon leaving the court, a defiant Senator Stevens urged Alaskans to re-elect
him, even so.8 “I will fight this unjust verdict with every ounce of energy I
have . . . I am innocent,”9 he proclaimed. “This verdict is the result of the
unconscionable manner in which the Justice Department lawyers conducted
this trial.”10 Within a week from the verdict was to be Stevens’s day of
reckoning with his constituents: “I ask that Alaskans and my Senate
colleagues stand with me as I pursue my rights. I remain a candidate for the
United States Senate.”11 The majority of the Alaskan electorate would not
believe the Senator; the conviction proved fatal to Stevens’s 40-year senate
career.12 The verdict demonstrated to the nation that even a prominent
citizen—a sitting United States Senator, repeatedly selected by his
constituents by wide vote margins to serve the best interests of his state13—
would be assured service of justice in the face of such wrongdoing.
The trouble was, by the measure of our system of fair justice,
Stevens’s conviction had been wrongfully procured.14 At the same time
Stevens lost his re-election bid, Barack Obama was elected President, and
Obama thereafter appointed Eric Holder to head the Department of Justice
as the U.S. Attorney General.15 By April of 2009, Holder had reviewed
Senator Stevens’s case (the Stevens Case) and directed U.S. District Court
Judge Emmet Sullivan to vacate Stevens’s conviction and dismiss the
indictment which had led to it.16 A newly-appointed team of federal
prosecutors investigating the case cited the basis for the dismissal as
prosecutors’ failure to produce “information that the government was
constitutionally required to provide to the defense for use at trial.”17 In
short, the DOJ had learned that its prosecutors had suppressed evidence
tending to favor Stevens’s side of the story—prosecutors had not provided
Stevens with exculpatory evidence as required under the Due Process Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.18
With this cloud of suspected egregious prosecutorial misconduct
looming heavily over the Justice Department, renewed calls for reform to

8

Id.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Paul Kane, Sen. Ted Stevens Loses Reelection Bid, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/11/18/AR2008111803227.html; see also
Chaddock, supra note 1.
13
Blake, supra note 3 (noting Stevens’s first election in 1970 and his consistent election wins by
over 66% of the votes ever since).
14
See Toobin, supra note 1, at 39.
15
Id.
16
United States v. Stevens, No. 08-cr-231 (EGS), 2009 WL 6525926, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009).
17
Id. at *2.
18
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
9
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the system were immediate, and they have persisted ever since.19 “How
could this have happened?”20 The high-profile Stevens Case only highlights
what many citizens worry about with a potential for abrogation of our
rights—given our capable yet imperfect system of justice—and reminds us
it is probably happening more than we would like to think. The frightening
notion that well-educated, specially-trained individuals who are supposed to
protect us from further harm, may instead turn out to be “the bad guys,”
naturally does not comport with our ingrained American sense of justice.
On a fishing trip to a remote area of Alaska in September of 2010,
Stevens died in a small plane crash,21 underscoring the tragic end of a life
widely perceived as wrongfully tainted by prosecutorial misconduct.
Special counsel appointed by Judge Sullivan to investigate the acts of the
prosecutors involved with the case released a findings report on March 15,
2012.22 No doubt to strike emphasis, on that same day Alaska’s remaining
Republican U.S. Senator, Lisa Murkowski, who served with Stevens prior to
his lost bid for re-election, introduced her proposed bill, the Fairness in
Disclosure of Evidence Act (FIDOE).23 This legislation attempts to codify
guidance to federal prosecutors in disclosure of evidence tending to favor a
defendant; it proposes express laws that have otherwise been foreign to our
system of procedural due process.24
This Comment will explore the general issues surrounding
prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence and will assess the merits of
FIDOE’s codification of disclosure of exculpatory evidence rules. In Part II, a
background of this Comment will be presented, detailing more precisely the
Stevens Case as an illustration and outlining the current state of the disclosure
law, guidance, and standards governing what is expected of prosecutors in
19
See, e.g., Robert M. Cary, Exculpatory Evidence: A Call for Reform After the Unlawful
Prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens, 36 No. 4 LITIG. 34, 34 (2010); Mark Memmott, Report Slams Sen.
Stevens’ Prosecutors, NPR (Mar. 15, 2012, 10:15 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2012/03/15/148668283/report-slams-sen-stevens-prosecutors (“[T]he government’s actions during
the Stevens case have led to calls for new laws and federal rules to govern prosecutors’ conduct.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director, and Jesselyn McCurdy,
Senior Legislative Counsel, ACLU, to James Sensenbrenner, Jr., Chairman, Robert C. Scott, Ranking
Member, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security (Apr.
18, 2012) (relating ACLU’s stance with regard to the committee hearing on the prosecution of Stevens).
20
Cary, supra note 19, at 34.
21
See Chaddock, supra note 1.
22
See Notice of Filing of Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan, In re Special Proceedings, 842 F.
Supp. 2d 232 (2012) (Misc. No. 09-0198 (EGS)), 2012 WL 858523.
23
See Press Release, Lisa Murkowski, Senator Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Enforce Ethical Legal
Prosecutions (Mar. 15, 2012), http://www.murkowski.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=PressReleases
&ContentRecord_id=5b41d548-ab47-464f-a627-8b1702b75145 [hereinafter Murkowski Press Release].
24
Id. FIDOE was introduced in March 2012 during the 112th Congress and was referred to the
Senate Judiciary Committee for hearings. See Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197,
112th Cong. (2012). Although the bill died in committee during the 112th Congress, a staff member with
Senator Murkowski’s office informed this Comment author in November 2013 that FIDOE will likely be
reintroduced, without changes, in a subsequent Congress. This Comment therefore examines the
legislation as it was originally introduced in 2012. By the time this Comment was submitted for the
publication process, the bill had not yet been reintroduced.
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safeguarding the due process rights of a criminal defendant. Part II will also
introduce FIDOE’s component facets. Part III will analyze FIDOE in depth,
including: evaluating the aspects of the Act which are similar to the current
regime and those that are different to the justice process; examining how
effective such legislation might be in light of the known problem areas; and
analyzing FIDOE’s interface with our current governing case law, guidance,
and standards. Part III will next apply FIDOE to the failures of Stevens to
examine its hypothetical results.
In Part IV, this Comment offers
recommendations to U.S. lawmakers for improvements upon FIDOE before its
passage. Part V concludes this Comment.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Ted Stevens Case Suggests a Re-Examination of the System is
Necessary
That “the government did not play fair with Ted Stevens” is
“indisputable.”25 What had begun in 2004 as an investigation by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) into a potentially corrupt plan to build a private
prison in Alaska eventually revealed that a number of state legislators were
soliciting and accepting bribes from an oil-services firm CEO.26 The CEO of
the VECO Corporation, Bill Allen, emerged as the central figure in the web of
corruption that entangled elected members of the state legislature; as the source
of the bribes, Allen ultimately accepted a deal in May 2007, pleading guilty to
charges of bribery and conspiracy for his part in enticing four state
legislators.27 What was more, by the terms of that plea deal, Allen was to play
a key role in assisting federal prosecutors—in making more cases against
prominent politicians who had succumbed to illegal corruption.28 It was clear
that federal prosecutors were already aiming to use Allen—the trusted,
longtime friend of Ted Stevens, known to have overseen the expansion and
repairs of the senator’s Alaska home while he worked in Washington, D.C.29—
as a star witness against the sitting senator.30
25

Toobin, supra note 1, at 39.
Id. at 39–40. A group of legislators caught up with the bribery schemes fancied themselves the
“Corrupt Bastards Club,” with the Speaker of the House having distributed baseball caps embroidered
with the acronym “CBC.” Id. With most of the politicians acceding to bribes of meager thousands of
dollars, “the atmosphere was one of brazenness.” Id. at 40.
27
Id. Among the four legislators Allen acknowledged his guilt in bribing was Ted Stevens’s son,
state senator Ben Stevens. Id.
28
Id.
29
See Del Quentin Wilber, Attorney for Stevens Tells Jurors Alaska Senator ‘Is Honest,’ Did Not
Lie, WASH. POST, Sept. 26, 2008, at A03, available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2008-0926/politics/36834130_1_allen-and-veco-seventh-full-term-bill-allen; see also Dermot Cole, ‘Gator Arms’
Claim Shows Prosecutor Had No Clue About Ted Stevens, FAIRBANKS DAILY NEWS-MINER (Mar. 15,
2012, 1:29 PM), http://www.newsminer.com/gator-arms-claim-shows-prosecutor-had-no-clue-aboutted/article_b61d6c07-c3ce-5307-88b1-818f226f37fb.html?mode=story (“If [Stevens] did anything
wrong, it was that he was too close to a guy like Allen . . . . “).
30
See Toobin, supra note 1, at 40.
26
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Yet the government’s case against Stevens was “dubious from the
outset.”31 The government could never actually charge Stevens with
something as substantial as bribery, and there was never an allegation of
quid pro quo dealings with VECO, even though it had been awarded major
federal contracts.32 In its late July indictment, the prosecution could only
muster that Stevens had accepted “more than $250,000”—a relatively paltry
amount for someone who could have likely afforded to pay it—in “free
labor, materials, and other things of value” related to renovations,
improvements, repair, and maintenance of the chalet,33 without disclosing so
in seven years of annual EIGA forms.34 Facing his seventh senate bid,
Stevens felt that he could win re-election “only if he had already beaten the
case against him”; thus, Stevens himself demanded expedited proceedings,
requesting that his trial take place within seventy days of the indictment.35
Stevens maintained that he had paid the bills for the work, at $160,000,
believing the whole time that his payments covered the entire cost.36 “You
can’t fill out a form and report what was kept from you from the
deviousness of someone like Bill Allen,” stated Stevens’s attorney.37
The prosecution’s collective failures in supplying exculpatory
evidence during the Stevens Case have become the most notorious example
of discovery violations in our criminal justice system’s most-recent
history.38 Although there is dispute whether the withholding of exculpatory
information was intentional or inadvertent,39 it is now widely regarded that,
had the prosecution turned over the exculpatory information that it held, as it
was obligated to do, there was a good chance that Stevens would have been
spared by an acquittal.40
As an exculpatory evidence illustration, the Stevens Case is a sad
tale of disorganization and haste, lack of consistent methodology,

31

Id. at 41.
Id.
33
See Stevens Indictment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 19–25; see also Toobin, supra note 1, at 41.
34
Stevens Indictment, supra note 2, ¶ 82.
35
Toobin, supra note 1, at 41.
36
Neil A. Lewis, Stevens Is Challenged at Ethics Trial, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/21/washington/21stevens.html?_r=0.
37
Wilber, supra note 29.
38
See, e.g., Peter A. Joy, The Criminal Discovery Problem: Is Legislation a Solution?, 52
WASHBURN L.J. 37, 37–38 (2012).
39
Compare Report to Hon. Emmet G. Sullivan of Investigation Conducted Pursuant to the Court’s
Order, In Re Special Proceedings, 842 F. Supp. 2d 232 (2012) (Misc. No. 09-0198 (EGS)), 2012 WL
858523 [hereinafter Schuelke Report] (finding certain pieces of exculpatory evidence intentionally
withheld), with DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS
OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN UNITED STATES V. THEODORE F. STEVENS 25–27 [hereinafter OPR
Report] (finding no intentional withholding violations).
40
E.g., Charlie Savage & Michael S. Schmidt, Inner Workings of Senator’s Troubled Trial Detailed,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2012, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/ 03/16/us/politics/reportdetails-inner-workings-of-troubled-ethics-trial-of-senator-ted-stevens.html?_r=0.
32
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insufficient oversight by supervisors, and general finger-pointing.41 Stevens
prosecutors had never conducted a comprehensive and effective review for
exculpatory evidence.42 During discovery, “Stevens prosecutors responded
to the defense requests issue by issue, granting some and refusing others,”
and for an investigation which yielded thousands of documents and
hundreds of hours of surveillance tapes, the discovery process in general
was “draining and time-consuming.”43 In the aftermath of the trial, several
items have been acknowledged as clear candidates for disclosure under
prosecutor due process obligations.44
Among the worst of undisclosed exculpatory evidence, trial
testimony given by Bill Allen had left the jurors with the “mistaken
impression that Allen had been telling authorities all along that Stevens had
cooked up a cover story about wanting to pay all the bills” without a true
intention of doing so.45 Highly injurious to Stevens’s defense was the nowinfamous cross-examination incident of the “Torricelli note,” so-named for
its reference to Robert Torricelli, a New Jersey senator who was forced from
office for accepting illegal gifts.46 In a 2002 memo, which Stevens’s
counsel had given to the prosecution during discovery,47 Stevens had written
to Allen:
Thanks for all the work on the chalet. You owe me a bill—
remember Torricelli, my friend. Friendship is one thing—
compliance with these ethics rules entirely different. I
asked Bob P[ersons] to talk to you about this so don’t get
P.O.’d at him—it just has to be done right. 48
Not surprisingly, the defense planned to seize an opportunity to use
the note as demonstrative of Stevens’s good intentions from very early on.49
But during defense cross-examination on the stand, Allen testified that even
though asked to, he had not sent Stevens the bill because, in speaking with
Stevens’s friend Persons, Persons had said, “[O]h, Bill, don’t worry about
getting a bill . . . Ted is just covering his ass.”50 Thus, Allen’s testimony
“turned Stevens’s best evidence against him. It seemed to show that the
41
See Carrie Johnson, Report: Prosecutors Hid Evidence in Ted Stevens Case, NPR (Mar. 15, 2012,
5:56 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/03/15/148687717/report-prosecutors-hid-evidence-in-ted-stevenscase.
42
Schuelke Report, supra note 39, at 3.
43
Toobin, supra note 1, at 42.
44
See, e.g., OPR Report, supra note 39, at 25–27.
45
Johnson, supra note 41.
46
Toobin, supra note 1, at 43.
47
See Dermot Cole, Forgery Claim Shows Prosecutor Was Clueless About Ted Stevens, FAIRBANKS
DAILY NEWS-MINER (Mar. 16, 2012), http://m.newsminer.com/forgery-claim-shows-prosecutor-wasclueless-about-ted-stevens/article_47d3a039-a558-5b53-9ab0-ee7074a7eb2e.html?mode=jqm; see also
Toobin, supra note 1, at 44. The note was given to the prosecution in early April 2008. Id.
48
Toobin, supra note 1, at 43.
49
Id.
50
Id.
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Torricelli note was actually part of [his] cover–up rather than proof of his
innocence.”51 Yet on the fifty-five different occasions that prosecutors and
the FBI interviewed Allen, he never alluded to this; it was not until the eve
of trial that Allen incorporated the Persons anecdote into his accounting.52
And although prosecutors recognized the significance of the
evolution, even during cross examination when Allen denied that the
claimed “cover your ass” angle was a recent addition to his story,
prosecutors did not take steps to inform the defense of the contradiction of
testimony.53 More unbelievable, in the months following the trial and
conviction of Stevens, Eric Holder’s newly-appointed prosecution team
uncovered something that had never been disclosed before: in an interview
with five Stevens prosecutors nearly half a year before the trial, Allen had
said he never even recalled speaking with Persons at all, let alone
mentioning that Persons had asserted Stevens was only meaning to “cover
his ass.”54 Though the inconsistency clearly favored Stevens, at least by the
time prosecutors became aware of Allen’s newly-materialized covering-hisass anecdote, no prosecutors revealed this information at any time before or
during the trial.55
Another significant piece of exculpatory information known to the
prosecution, yet never disclosed, was that Allen himself insisted to both
prosecutors and an FBI agent, on two separation occasions, that the
$250,000 in renovations reflected in VECO records was incorrect; the value
of the work on the Stevens chalet “could not have been more than
Finally, rounding off the winning roster of Stevens’s
$80,000.”56
undisclosed exculpatory evidence relevant to the government’s key witness,
Bill Allen—prosecutors failed to inform Stevens of important impeachment
information that could have destroyed Allen’s credibility: an allegation that
in once carrying on a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old prostitute,
Bambi Tyree, Allen was then involved in inducing her to a false sworn
statement. 57 And although Tyree’s accounting of the inducement by Allen
had been memorialized in FBI notes in 2004, even when Stevens attorneys
specifically inquired with prosecutors as to rumors about Allen’s
questionable relationships and his credibility, prosecutors responded that
“the government conducted a thorough investigation and was unable to find

51

Id.
Schuelke Report, supra note 39, at 18, 19.
53
Id. at 26.
54
Toobin, supra note 1, at 44.
55
Id.; see also Schuelke Report, supra note 39, at 26.
56
Schuelke Report, supra note 39, at 23–25; see also OPR Report, supra note 39, at 25.
57
Carrie Johnson, Justice Department’s Handling of Sen. Stevens Case to be Aired on Capitol Hill,
NPR (Mar. 27, 2012, 9:50 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/03/27/149455988/justicedepartments-handling-of-sen-stevens-case-to-be-aired-on-capitol-hill; accord OPR Report, supra note
39, at 25; Schuelke Report, supra note 39, at 28.
52
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any evidence to support it.”58
Of final impact to Stevens’s defense would have been the disclosure
of the statements of a witness who had worked on the chalet renovations,
Rocky Williams.59 During prosecution interviews, Williams had repeatedly
corroborated Stevens’s story, saying that Stevens had told him he wanted to
pay for all the renovations, and that along with Stevens, Williams himself
believed that bills sent to Stevens by Allen and VECO included all costs
associated with the renovations.60 Williams, however, had fallen ill while in
Washington D.C. for the trial, and prosecutors sent him home to Alaska on
the day of opening statements without informing the defense; he was thus
unavailable for sworn testimony that likely would have otherwise revealed
his corroborating evidence.61 Thus, by way of illustration of the Stevens
Case, it is apparent that failures to disclose exculpatory evidence—whether
intentional or inadvertent—can unfairly disadvantage a criminal defendant.
B. Our Principles of Justice Place the Burden on the Prosecutor to
Disclose Exculpatory Evidence
A defendant in a criminal case has no general constitutional right to
discovery.62 However, a prosecutor’s suppression of evidence favorable to
the accused—evidence that would tend to exculpate him of guilt or reduce
his penalty (collectively recognized as “exculpatory evidence”)63—lends
itself to an unfair trial and thus is a constitutional violation of due process.64
A government—with its superior investigative resources and access to
critical evidence discovered by its law enforcement officials—is well
situated to encounter exculpatory evidence during a criminal inquiry.65 As
such, when in possession and aware of such evidence, a prosecutor’s duty to
relay the information to the defense is fundamental—less we run the risk of
deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Constitution66 and procurement of a
defendant’s conviction which is “inconsistent with the rudimentary demands
of justice.”67 “Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when
criminal trials are fair,” the U.S. Supreme Court has decreed; “our system of
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated unfairly.”68
58

Johnson, supra note 57; accord Schuelke Report, supra note 39, at 28; OPR Report, supra note
39, at 25.
59
See Schuelke Report, supra note 39, at 6–7, 28; accord OPR Report, supra note 39, at 26.
60
See Schuelke Report, supra note 39, at 6–7, 28; accord OPR Report, supra note 39, at 26.
61
Schuelke Report, supra note 39, at 8; accord OPA Report, supra note 39, at 26.
62
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977).
63
See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 679–80 (1985) (dismissing differences between
exculpatory evidence and impeachment evidence for purposes of materiality under Brady).
64
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87–88 (1963).
65
BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 5:1 (2d ed. 2012).
66
See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).
67
See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (finding prosecutor’s “deliberate deception” by
use of known perjured testimony was unjust).
68
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
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A “fair trial” is a trial which results in a verdict “worthy of
confidence”; suppression of exculpatory evidence has the effect of
undermining the confidence in the outcome of a trial.69 Thus, if withholding
the defendant’s favorable evidence were permissible, a prosecutor would be
granted broad opportunity to serve as an “architect” in a proceeding, which
does not comport with our standards of justice.70 A prosecutor’s role is
more than that of an advocate, “[h]e is a representative of the
government”;71 his job is not merely to “win,” but rather, to ensure that
justice is served.72 Therefore, a prosecutor “is in a peculiar and very definite
sense the servant of the law” whose aim is to ensure both that “guilt shall
not escape or innocence suffer.”73 Several authorities currently mold the
prosecutorial obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence, including rulings
by the Supreme Court;74 model rules of professional attorney conduct; 75
statutes and procedural disclosure rules;76 and guidelines issued by states or
the federal government, such as the Department of Justice’s United States
Attorneys’ Manual.77
1. Prosecutorial Guidance for Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence
a. Constitutional Requirements Promulgated by the U.S.
Supreme Court
Our formulation of the prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence has been shaped and refined by the U.S. Supreme Court, especially
over the last half-century. In Brady v. Maryland, its 1963 seminal case on
the subject, the Court confirmed that the right of the defendant to his
favorable evidence is founded foremost under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.78 In this case, the defendant Brady had testified on
his own behalf and had admitted to participation in a murder, but claimed
that another charged defendant had committed the actual killing.79
Unbeknownst to Brady, the other defendant had confessed to the actual
homicide, and although Brady’s counsel had requested the other defendant’s
extrajudicial statements, the prosecution withheld the statement containing
the other defendant’s confession.80 Therefore, defense counsel’s strategy
became to concede Brady’s involvement, but focus on urging the jury to
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
Brady, 373 U.S. at 88.
GERSHMAN, supra note 65, at § 5:1.
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
Id. (emphasis added).
See discussion infra Part II.1.a.
See discussion infra Part II.1.b.
See discussion infra Part II.1.b.
See discussion infra Part II.1.b. Specific state guidance is beyond the scope of this Comment.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
Id. at 84.
Id.
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avoid the death penalty.81 Because of his admitted involvement, Brady’s
conviction was upheld—but the Court affirmed that the evidence withheld
was still “material” to Brady’s sentence.82 The Court announced that
suppression of requested evidence which is favorable to an accused
“violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to
punishment . . . . “83 The Court further held that such suppression amounted
to a wrongful prejudicial violation of the defendant’s rights, “irrespective of
the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”84 Such exculpatory evidence,
when material as defined by the Court, is commonly known now as “Brady
material.”85
In examining impeachment evidence in 1972 with Giglio v. United
States, the Court further contemplated which types of information, held in
the prosecution’s control, would violate a defendant’s due process rights if
not disclosed.86 The defendant in Giglio was convicted of passing forged
money orders and sentenced to a five-year prison term.87 Prosecutors had
not disclosed to the defense that its key witness, the defendant’s coconspirator, a teller who had cashed several of the forged money orders, was
told by a previously-assigned Assistant U.S. Attorney that he would not be
prosecuted by the government if he testified against Giglio.88 Such
information, useful to Giglio’s defense strategy, thus was not available to
Giglio’s attorney for use in discrediting the witness.89 When pressed during
trial about a “deal” with prosecutors, the witness actually indicated there had
not been one; the prosecutor then confirmed that the witness “received no
promises that he would not be indicted.”90 The Court concluded that,
“[w]hen the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of
guilt or innocence,’” suppression of evidence affecting witness credibility
violates Brady—that is, is material—if the information would have had
“any reasonable likelihood” of affecting the judgment of the jury.91 The
Court repeated its previous case law point that, even when false evidence
was not solicited, when knowingly left uncorrected, due process error
results.92 The Court further elaborated that it mattered not whether the
previous prosecutor had failed to relate the details of the agreement to his
associate; the Court stated, “[t]he prosecutor’s office is an entity and . . . is
81

Id.
Id. at 87–90.
Id. at 87 (emphasis added).
84
Id.
85
See, e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106–
07 (1976).
86
Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 151–54 (1972).
87
Id. at 150.
88
Id. at 150–53.
89
Id. at 151.
90
Id. at 151–53 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
Id. at 154 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 271 (1959)).
92
Id. at 153 (citing Napue, 360 U.S. at 269).
82
83
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the spokesman for the Government. A promise made by one attorney must
be attributed, for these purposes, to the Government.”93 Thus, the Court
proposed that prosecution office procedures and regulations should be
established to assure communication of all relevant information to every
attorney who ultimately works on a case.94
Three other significant cases provided the Court opportunity to
elaborate upon our Brady and Giglio rules.95 In examining its prior holdings
in 1975, the Court established in United States v. Agurs that a defendant’s
right to a fair trial is jeopardized when the prosecution introduces trial
testimony that it knew or should have known was perjured.96 In 1985, with
United States v. Bagley, the Court disclaimed differences between
exculpatory and impeachment evidence for the purposes of Brady, and
clarified that irrespective of any defense requests or lack of such requests for
exculpatory information—that favorable evidence is material, and thus
constitutional error results simply from suppression whenever there is a
“reasonable probability” that undisclosed evidence could lead to a different
result.97
Bagley heavily informed the opinion of Kyles v. Whitley in 1995,
where the Court emphasized and honed several points.98 First, the Bagley
reasonable probability standard does not question whether a defendant
would receive a different verdict in light of exculpatory evidence, but rather
if, in the absence of nondisclosure, the defendant would receive a fair trial,
one producing “a verdict worthy of confidence.”99 Next, the Court
explained that materiality is not a test for insufficiency of incriminating
evidence against exculpatory evidence; the inquiry is whether the favorable
evidence could “reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a
different light” that confidence in the verdict would be undermined.100 Of
final significance, the Court in Kyles stressed that materiality shall not be
measured item-by-item, but rather consideration shall be made for an overall
cumulative effect of any exculpatory evidence.101 Although this measure
assigns discretion to the prosecutor, it nonetheless imposes a corresponding
burden; the prosecution alone is privy to that which is undisclosed, and thus
must gauge the likely “net effect”—ensuring disclosure when the limit of
“reasonable probability” is attained.102 Furthermore, the Court elaborated,
such prosecutor assaying “in turn means that the individual prosecutor has a
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 154 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 272 (1958)).
Id. at 154.
See, e.g., Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 442–43 (1995).
United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676–77 (1985); see also Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433–34.
Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434–38.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 435.
Id. at 436–37.
Id. at 437.
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duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on the
government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”103
In 1999, Strickler v. Greene provided the Court opportunity to
elucidate upon—and somewhat restrain—the scope of the requirement of
release of Brady material.104 The Court noted that the term “Brady
violation” was sometimes used to refer to any breach of a general, broad
obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence. In drawing upon a prosecutor’s
duty to serve as an advocate of justice, the Court noted that such “special
status” actually “explains both the basis for the prosecution’s broad duty of
disclosure and our conclusion that not every violation of that duty
necessarily establishes that the outcome was unjust.”105 Therefore, the
Court clarified that “strictly speaking,” a “real ‘Brady violation’” would
never flow unless suppressed exculpatory evidence—that is, suppressed
Brady material—would have actually held reasonable probability of
producing a verdict more favorable to the defendant.106 Thus, with Strickler,
the Court appears to have confirmed that the government’s belief in the
defendant’s guilt, the strategy of the prosecution, and the subjective
judgment of the prosecutor play a definitive role in the obligation to release
of Brady material.
Thus, through a series of amalgamated opinions, the Supreme Court
has promulgated guidance on prosecutorial duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence favorable to a criminal defendant. However, the constitutional
requirements of disclosure under the Brady line of cases are merely a
starting point in that they “only establish[] a floor”—the “minimum extent”
of a prosecutor’s obligation.107 Notably, however, the Court has never
proposed the timeframe in which favorable evidence disclosures must be
made.108
b. Items Further Shaping Prosecutorial Duty of Disclosure
There are other sources of guidance that also induce federal
prosecutors to disclose favorable evidence. One influential canon is found
in the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, adopted as the professional ethics rules by nearly every state.109
Model Rule 3.8(d), widely adopted verbatim or in comparable substantive

103

Id.
See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280–82 (1999).
Id. at 281 (emphasis added).
106
Id. (emphasis added).
107
Kirsten M. Schimpff, Rule 3.8, the Jencks Act, and How the ABA Created A Conflict Between
Ethics and the Law on Prosecutorial Disclosure, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1729, 1739 (2012).
108
Id. at 1736
109
See id. at 1731 (explaining that proponents of broader disclosure requirements have been most
successful within the area of ethics laws adopted and enforced by the states).
104
105
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verbiage,110 indicates that a prosecutor “shall . . . make timely disclosure to
the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that
tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and, in
connection with sentencing, [shall] disclose to the defense . . . all
unprivileged mitigating information known . . . . “111 States can legally
enforce the ethics rule against both state prosecutors and federal prosecutors,
since federal law subjects federal government attorneys to the ethical
standards of the state in which they practice.112 Model Rule 3.8(d)
effectively imposes broader disclosure obligations than what has been
deemed required under the Constitution.113
Other sources which inform prosecutor disclosure obligations are
requirements at the federal level alone.114 One such source is 18 U.S.C. §
3500, known as the Jencks Act,115 which provides that once a prosecution
witness has given direct examination testimony, on motion from the
defendant, the court must order the United States to produce prior
statements made by that witness to the defense, when related to the testified
subject matter.116 Although the timing element of the Jencks Act is seen as
“necessary in part to protect government witnesses from harassment,
intimidation, and tampering,”117 the Act has been strictly enforced by the
courts, and thus nonetheless provides defendants with an opportunity to
examine witness statements for the purposes of questioning credibility and
for potential impeachment.118 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2
emulates the requirements of the Jencks Act, but imposes them in
procedural form, requiring the prosecution to produce witness statements
pertaining to direct examination witness testimony, upon motion of the
defendant.119
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 outlines the discovery and

110
See id. at 1742–43 (noting that most states have adopted the rule verbatim, while others have
modified the rule or else based the prosecutorial obligations on comparable provisions contained in the
predecessor model code to the current Model Rules).
111
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009).
112
28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2012).
113
Schimpff, supra note 107, at 1731.
114
See infra notes 115–36 and accompanying text.
115
See Olan G. Waldrop, Jr., The Jencks Act, 20 A.F. L. REV. 93, 94–96 (1978). The act is
nicknamed for the decision of Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), where a union president was
charged with falsely swearing in an affidavit not to be a member of the Communist Party. Id. at 94. The
government had refused to turn over witness statements related to associated events. Id. at 95. The Court
ruled that Jencks was entitled to inspection of the statements to decide if the statements could be useful to
his defense. Id. In response, Congress enacted the Jencks Act in 1957, to limit the effect of the Jencks
decision. Id. at 96.
116
18 U.S.C. §§ 3500(a)–(b) (2012).
117
Schimpff, supra note 107, at 1737.
118
See id. at 1737–38 (“[The Jencks Act] applies regardless of whether there is any realistic danger
of interference with witnesses[,] . . . [and] courts have strictly enforced [its provisions].”).
119
Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2(a), with 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a)–(b).
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inspection process obligations for both parties.120 However, this rule is
focused on the discovery process more generally, and so in contrast to the
disclosure rules imposed on prosecutors by the Constitution, the furnishing
of information is only required when elicited by the defendant’s specific
request.121 Furthermore, the rule does not implicate exculpatory evidence
per se; the defendant—upon request—need only be given access to items
“material to preparing the defense.”122 Yet the rule does impose a
continuing duty to disclose additional evidence or material “promptly”—
even during trial—when the evidence is subject to discovery or inspection
under the rule and either the opposing party had previously requested its
production, or the court had ordered it.123 The rule further compels
compliance by authorizing penalties for failure to do so, including providing
for a court order; granting of a continuance; and any other “just” remedy.124
Finally, Department of Justice policies under chapter 9-5.000 of the
United States Attorneys’ Manual (USAM) establish guidelines for exercise
of judgment and discretion of its prosecutors with regard to disclosure
obligations of exculpatory and impeachment information and potential
impeachment information of government witnesses.125 Chapter 9-5.001
names Brady, Giglio, and Kyles as the bases of constitutional authority for
the requirement of disclosure of exculpatory evidence.126 The USAM posits
that, consistent with Bagley, such favorable evidence must be disclosed
when there is reasonable probability that effective use of the evidence will
result in an acquittal—but indicates that “it is sometimes difficult to assess
the materiality of evidence before trial . . . . “127 Therefore, prosecutors
“must take a broad view of materiality and err on the side of disclos[ure] . . .
.”128 Chapter 9-5.001 further charges the federal prosecutor to seek all
exculpatory evidence from all members of the “prosecution team,” which
includes federal, state, and local law enforcement officers and other
government officials participating in the investigation and prosecution of the
case.129
Of further significance, the USAM suggests that due process
120
See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (outlining “Government’s Disclosure” in part (a) and
“Defendant’s Disclosure” in part (b)).
121
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1)(E) (“Upon a defendant’s request, the government must permit the
defendant to inspect and to copy or photograph [discovery materials] . . . within the government’s
possession, custody, or control . . . . “) (emphasis added).
122
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E)(i).
123
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c).
124
FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(d)(2).
125
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL ch. 9-5.000, ch. 9-5001(F), (2010)
[hereinafter USAM], http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/5mcrm.htm (last
visited Oct. 13, 2014).
126
Id. ch. 9-5.001(B).
127
Id. ch. 9-5.001(B)(1).
128
Id.
129
Id. ch. 9-5.001(B)(2) (citation omitted).
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dictates that disclosure of exculpatory evidence material to guilt or
innocence should be made timely, to permit the defendant to make effective
use of the information at trial.130 This means that exculpatory information
“must be disclosed reasonably promptly after it is discovered,”131 and that
impeachment information “will typically be disclosed at a reasonable time
before trial to allow the trial to proceed efficiently.”132 Yet, the USAM
points to prosecutorial discretion with delivering of impeachment
information when factoring other significant interests, such as witness
security and national security.133
Furthermore, in response to the discovery botches of the Stevens
Case, the DOJ issued its “Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal
Discovery,”134 a memorandum based on USAM Chapter 9-5.000 but
containing a more detailed framework from which prosecutors should draw
their guiding disclosure principles.135 Among the guidance set forth, the
memorandum cites the need for prosecutors to determine if review of
potentially-discoverable information which has been collected by the entire
prosecution team is necessary; encourages review of all potentially
discoverable material within control of the prosecution team (including an
investigative agency’s files, confidential informant or witness files,
substantive case-related communications, and information contained in
witness interviews); explains the procedure for conduction the review; and
outlines the steps for making the pertinent disclosures as well as creating a
record of such disclosures.136
C. The Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act: Progressive Legislative
Reform?
Given the many instances when exculpatory evidence has not been
released by prosecutors, resulting in unfair trials,137 reform of and
improvements to the existing regime have occupied the minds of many
advocates for a long time.138 Under the current guidance scheme available
130

Id. ch. 9-5.001(D) (citation omitted).
Id. ch. 9-5.001(D)(1).
Id. ch. 9-5.001(D)(2).
133
Id.
134
See Dep’t of Justice, Statement for the Record, Hearing on the Prosecution of Senator Ted Stevens
2–3 (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.justice.gov/ola/testimony/112-2/03-28-12-doj-statement.pdf.
135
See generally David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., Memorandum for Department Prosecutors,
Guidance for Prosecutors Regarding Criminal Discovery (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.justice.gov
/dag/discovery-guidance.html.
136
See id.
137
See, e.g., cases cited supra Part II.B.1.a.
138
See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533, 1545–54,
1557, 1566 (2010). Such proposed reforms have included: imposing responsibility on supervisors for
subordinates’ Brady violations, and providing for disciplinary actions against such supervisors; more
stringent, pro-active review by state ethics boards; “Prosecution Review Boards” charged directly with
evaluating disciplinary claims; providing for civil liability; actual criminalization of Brady violations;
public exposure of prosecutors who commit Brady violations; rewarding prosecutors financially for
131
132
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to prosecutors, the reasons for suppression resulting in constitutional error
run a gamut—from simple inadvertent lapses of judgment to egregious
intentional misconduct.139 However, “[d]eterring prosecutors from the
deliberate suppression of Brady evidence . . . is not the gravest danger in this
area of criminal law. The most pressing problem relates to how wellmeaning prosecutors tend to interpret their constitutional disclosure
obligations in a way that all too often leads to withholding.”140 Therefore,
any reforms instituted must be considered in light of the range of a
prosecutor’s potential reasons for nondisclosure of Brady information—
whether the problem originates with the prosecutor-advocate’s invidious,
strategic scheming, or merely because of a poor decision due to a simple
lapse of judgment.141
The proposed federal statute, the Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence
Act, attempts to remove the “guesswork” from the subjective control of the
federal prosecutor, generally by providing rules of consistency for favorable
evidence disclosure.142 Introduced on March 15, 2012, FIDOE is sponsored
by Senator Lisa Murkowski of Alaska and a bi-partisan group of cosponsors.143 It is intended to “help establish uniform standards for
prosecutorial disclosure.”144 The legislation has received support by the
ABA, the American Civil Liberties Union, and the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers.145
The following are among the general highlights of the Murkowski
bill which differs from the current disclosure regime: the bill disregards
what we have come to understand as “Brady material” relevant to disclosure
and what may be deemed a fair trial under due process considerations, and
instead governs the disclosure of so-defined “covered information” as that
which “may reasonably appear to be favorable to the defendant” with regard
to a determination of guilt, any preliminary matter before which prosecution
abiding by Constitutional disclosure requirements; improvement of office training and policies; formal,
internal review such as by office committees; pre-trial judicial review of all evidence; “open-file
discovery,” whereby all evidence known to the government is available to the accused; and simply
encouraging hiring of “people who already have good values” who can be trained to be ethical
prosecutors. Id.
139
See id. at 1544.
140
Id. at 1551.
141
See id. at 1551 (noting the problems with nondisclosure of Brady material actually associated with
the well-meaning prosecutor).
142
See generally Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).
143
See Murkowski Press Release, supra note 23. The U.S. Senators named as co-sponsors of the bill
are Republicans Lisa Murkowski (AK) and Kay Bailey Hutchison (TX), and Democrats Daniel Inouye
(HI), Daniel Akaka (HI), and Mark Begich (AK). Id. Senator Inouye passed away on December 17,
2012. Derrick DePledge, Sen. Daniel K. Inouye Dies at Age 88 of Respiratory Illness, HONOLULU STAR
ADVERTISER, (Dec. 17. 2012, 12:45 PM), http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking
/183853331.html?id=183853331. Senator Akaka retired in January 2013. See Senators Praise U.S. Sen.
Akaka’s Service, HONOLULU STAR ADVERTISER (Dec. 11, 2012, 3:48 PM), http://www.star
advertiser.com/news/breaking/183090611.html?id=183090611.
144
Murkowski Press Release, supra note 23 (quoting Senator Inouye).
145
Murkowski Press Release, supra note 23.
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is pending, or any sentence to be imposed;146 the bill introduces a definition
for the “prosecution team,” ensuring disclosure responsibility is inclusively
imposed upon any individual prosecutor as well as the “Executive agency”
for which he works, and any entity or individual working on behalf of, under
the control of, or with the Government on the criminal prosecution;147 the
bill requires disclosure of information in possession of the government or
which would become known by the exercise of due diligence;148 and the bill
specifies a timing requirement for disclosure to occur “without delay” upon
arraignment and before the entry of any guilty plea, or as soon as
“reasonably practicable” upon the existence of the evidence becoming
known, irrespective of defendant’s intent to enter a guilty plea.149 The bill
also enumerates remedies for noncompliance and a set standard of review
for appeals.150
In invoking standards above our constitutional minimums and
additionally addressing areas thus far left untouched by the Supreme Court,
the implications of FIDOE are clearly far-reaching—FIDOE is an overhaul
in comparison to the current federal disclosure of favorable evidence
scheme. In critically analyzing FIDOE’s constituent parts, examining its
effectiveness and its weaknesses, and applying its elements to the disclosure
errors of the Stevens Case as an illustration, this Comment will demonstrate
that FIDOE would indeed provide fortification and expansion to due process
protections of a criminal defendant, as sought by advocates of disclosure
reform; this is especially so when disclosure would be of the sort
intentionally withheld in bad faith, but FIDOE also supplies better guidance
for the well-meaning prosecutor, compelling disclosure in specified
instances and providing for increased opportunity to thoughtfully deliberate
before making disclosures on certain occasions. However, the proposed
legislation is not without its faults; some potential problem areas and
conflicts would be created by the enactment of FIDOE, and improvements
to FIDOE as drafted are in order.
III. ANALYSIS
Even with reform legislation such as the Fairness in Disclosure of
Evidence Act in place, because the soul of exculpatory evidence disclosure
requirements lies with due process rights under the Constitution, Brady and
its progeny and other sources guiding the prosecutorial duty151 will likely
continue to be relied upon as illustrative, teaching, and gap-filling
implements by attorneys and the courts alike. Thus, whether FIDOE would
146
147
148
149
150
151

S. 2197 § 2(a).
Id.
Id. § 2(b).
Id. § 2(c).
Id. §§ 2(g)–(i).
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
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bring important improvements to the current federal disclosure regime—and
whether, as the primary source of exculpatory evidence disclosure
requirements, it can successfully replace the current regime—ultimately
hinges upon whether it codifies or improves upon existing constitutional
rules, whether it compels the prosecutor to properly act by improved
instruction, what types of new weapons it supplies to the defense attorney’s
arsenal, whether it causes any detrimental effects to valuable aspects of the
present regime, and whether it supplies its own operational complications.
A critical examination of FIDOE’s provisions and their application to the
Stevens Case provides insight to these matters. One point to note, however,
is that, as federal law—although implementation of similar legislation at the
state and local levels would likely follow in time—FIDOE would not govern
state and local prosecutorial disclosure requirements, which will thus
continue to embrace our constitutionally-influenced case law rules, their
own current laws and procedural rules, and other relevant forms of
guidance.152
A. FIDOE Improves Upon Constitutional Requirements, Takes Aim at
Case Law Loopholes, and Motivates Compliance, but is Not Without its
Defects
1. FIDOE Definitions
The legislation as proposed generally codifies existing disclosure
guidance and fundamentally advances the due process rights of defendants,
but also leaves room for criticism. Under § 2(a), the definitions section of
the proposed statute, FIDOE defines “covered information.”153 “Covered
information” is deemed “information, data, documents, evidence, or
objects” that “may reasonably appear to be favorable to the defendant” with
regard to (1) the determination of guilt; (2) any preliminary matter before
the court where a criminal prosecution is pending; or (3) the sentence that is
to be imposed.154 Defining covered information in this way is clearly an
attempt to give parameters to what information must be disclosed, and from
Brady and its expounding progeny, is analogous to the exculpatory Brady
material which must itself be disclosed.155
Yet, although on its face the requirement for disclosure of Brady
material and disclosure of covered information appear very similar, it is
clear that the proposed new definition is more beneficial to a defendant—in
that it suggests a lower initial threshold obligating the release of
152

See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
S. 2197 § 2(a)(1).
Id.
155
See supra notes 78–85 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of
disclosure requirements under Brady).
153
154
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information. First, under the Brady line of cases, we have come to embrace
the notion of “materiality,”156 that Brady material need only be disclosed
when it would hold “reasonable probability” of affecting the jury’s decision
to favor the defendant, thus producing a Brady error.157 Further, our
Strickler illuminating rule tends to effectively constrain the release of Brady
material by acknowledging prosecutorial subjectivity and discretion as to
whether—even if favorable to the defendant—the disclosure is merely
While FIDOE clearly
necessary to avoid the Brady violation.158
contemplates the evidence disclosure relative to guilt or sentencing, aligning
with the long-pronounced materiality rule of Brady,159 the requirement of
disclosure when it might “reasonably appear to be favorable to the
defendant” delimits the ability of the prosecutor to consider his beliefs of
guilt, to ponder his strategy in light of those beliefs, and to subjectively
determine by his own measures whether the evidence is so immaterial that it
would not result in a due process violation if not disclosed. “Reasonable
appearance” of favorability is arguably a lower bar to disclosure than
“reasonable probability” of producing a better jury or sentencing result for
the defendant, because the latter requires initial “favorability” but
additionally permits the prosecutor’s further analytical deliberation,
allowing for a second subjective step of his own judgment. Therefore,
covered information encompasses a broader notion of what is required to be
disclosed,160 which could substantially better the criminal defendant’s access
to information over mere Brady requirements. Thus, it appears that the
FIDOE definition of covered information would likely induce more
disclosures by federal prosecutors in order to avoid a violation of the law—
disclosures that under the current regime may have never materialized at all.
A second aspect of the definition of “covered information” that
differs from our current regime is that the duty to disclose favorable
evidence must not merely be provided where relevant to a determination of
guilt or to punishment,161 but also must be provided if favorable with regard
to any “preliminary matter” before a court in which prosecution is
pending.162 Thus, this definition suggests a broader reach for required
disclosures by affirmatively proclaiming that such exculpatory evidence,
156

See supra notes 82, 83, 85, 91, 97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 97–102 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of the
“reasonable probability” standard).
158
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a on Strickler v. Greene.
159
See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a on Brady v. Maryland.¶
160
See Joy, supra note 38, at 53; accord Randy M. Mastro & Lee G. Dunst, § 112:21 Brady/Jencks
Disclosures–Brady Material, 10 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS. (3d ed. 2012) (“The bill seeks to define
the scope of exculpatory evidence that prosecutors are required to disclose. . . . [thus] eliminat[ing] the
subjective materiality standard under Brady.”).
161
See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
162
Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2(a)(1)(B) (2012). Note,
however, that under the Act, disclosure timing even with respect to any “preliminary matter” need not
occur earlier than “after arraignment.” See id. § 2(c)(1); see also discussion infra Part III.A.3 (examining
FIDOE’s timing requirements).
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when known, is relevant to not only to trial or sentencing but also to pretrial or pre-plea matters. These matters could potentially include such
evidence when discovered: in advance of a bail hearing; within the
prosecution’s continuing investigation; in relation to any issues treated by
pre-trial motions and hearings; at any point during the general discovery
process; and during plea bargain negotiations. Not only does this aspect of
the “covered information” definition enhance the defense’s ability to obtain
useful information early, and potentially allow its use to mitigate the
defendant’s circumstances along the way, but it also requires the prosecutor
to assess what precisely is known at each procedural step and consider
whether that evidence or information could reasonably favor the defendant
with respect to that particular legal or procedural matter. This will likely not
only induce more disclosures in general, but will induce more quality
disclosures pertinent to each stage of the prosecution.
Also under § 2(a), the “prosecution team” working on a criminal
case is defined.163 The prosecution team is similar in concept to that
referenced by USAM chapter 9-5.001(B)(2) and utilized by the DOJ in its
prosecutor guidance.164 FIDOE’s prosecution team includes both (1) the
“Executive agency”—incorporated by reference to 5 U.S.C. § 105 as “an
Executive department, a Government corporation, and an independent
establishment”165—that brings a criminal prosecution on behalf of the
United States,166 as well as (2) “any entity or individual, including a law
enforcement agency or official, that . . . acts on behalf of[,] . . . under the
control of[,] . . . [or] participates, jointly with the Executive agency . . . in
any investigation with respect to the criminal prosecution.”167 Under the
first aspect of the defined prosecution team, typically the Executive
department will simply be the Justice Department’s U.S. Attorney’s Office
prosecuting a case, so most of the time, the codified definition would merely
coincide with our current notions of with whom the disclosure duty lies.
Further, in many senses, this notion is a codification of the Giglio rule that
the prosecutor’s office is one entity, and information known to one member
of the entity is considered known to the entire entity for the purposes of
favorable evidence disclosure.168 However, the incorporation of the
Executive agency into the definition of the prosecution team could have
some significance when, for example, private attorneys are contracted for
particular purposes, such as special independent investigative counsels.169
163

See S. 2197 § 2(a)(2)(A).
See supra notes 129, 136 and accompanying text.
5 U.S.C. § 105 (2006).
166
S. 2197 § 2(a)(2)(A).
167
Id. § 2(a)(2)(B).
168
See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
169
See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659–60 (1988) (finding constitutional EIGA’s
provision for the appointment of special independent counsels to investigate and prosecute certain highranking Government officials for violations of federal criminal laws).
164
165
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Therefore, the Executive agency reference expressly clarifies that any entity
or individual holding the power to disclose exculpatory evidence may be
burdened with the obligation to do so, irrespective of private or independent
disposition, so long as the criminal prosecution is being conducted on behalf
of the United States.
Further, the second component of the definition of prosecution team
expressly reaches all other potential entities or individuals who may provide
support to the Executive agency. Such persons could include those who
work for any U.S. law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI; the Drug
Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms,
and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service; or Customs and Border
Protection, and could even reach state or local prosecutors or law
enforcement who may be working jointly in any manner with the Executive
agency. Moreover, defining this second set of individuals who are
participating on behalf of, under the control of, or jointly with the federal
prosecutor could mean that even government informants or witnesses may
be required to relate acquired exculpatory information to the prosecutor. In
some ways, this component of the prosecution team definition is a mere
codification of the Kyles rule that favorable evidence in the hands of others
acting on the government’s behalf is necessarily favorable evidence which
must be obtained and managed by the prosecution—or risk constitutional
error.170 Yet in other ways, this definitive codification lends far more
credibility to an argument by the defense that posits the disclosure
requirement upon any players reachable by the statute’s language.
Codifying an overarching definition for the prosecutorial team
enhances a defendant’s exculpatory-evidence-seeking mission because all
players who are in a position to violate the disclosure requirements are
expressly designated therein and are thus made aware of their duty under the
law. The widely-cast net over such actors could lead to more disclosures,
and could also lead to more disclosure violations from which error could
result. However, with such far-reaching implications, the Executive agency
will undoubtedly become responsible for conferring training upon all such
players involved with the criminal prosecution to understand what
exculpatory evidence is and why it must be relayed to the prosecutor. Thus,
the Executive agency will need to activate solid guidance to ensure
methodical compliance with such reporting.
2. Duty to Disclose Favorable Information
Section 2(b) imposes the duty to disclose favorable information.171
Under § 2(b), the prosecutor shall exercise his duty to disclose the covered
170
171

See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
S. 2197 § 2(b).
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information whenever that information is (1) “within the possession,
custody, or control of the prosecution team,” 172 or (2) whenever the
“existence” of the information is known, “or by the exercise of due diligence
would become known,” to the government prosecutor.173 In light of the
definition of “covered information” previously discussed,174 the first prong
of the duty provides for sensible compelling of disclosure of the favorable
evidence.
The second prong of the exercise of the duty, however, provides
something different to the disclosure regime. First off, it suggests that mere
awareness of the potential “existence” of covered information should
compel the duty to disclose, which implies that specificity of the
information is not necessary to invoke the duty—which leads to a deduction
that it would be possible that such information could ultimately turn out not
to be covered information as contemplated by the statute. But the second
prong of the duty goes even further, suggesting that the prosecutor must
exercise due diligence to pursue information to enlighten himself if he even
suspects exculpatory evidence merely exists—so that he may disclose it.
Therefore, both components of the second prong of duty would likely lead
to a due diligence pursuit of exculpatory information, either because it is
initially suspected but not per se known, or because the smart prosecutoradvocate would not likely want to disclose the mere existence of “potential”
exculpatory information without understanding its specific nature and
whether it would ultimately be “covered,” therefore requiring disclosure.
While one may say the second prong of the duty requirement
codifies the Kyles rule that a prosecutor holds “a duty to learn of any
favorable evidence” known to others acting on the government’s behalf,
which is also guidance proffered by the DOJ,175 one could also argue that
the specific text of FIDOE takes this too far, by imposing an affirmative
duty to continually investigate any minor possibility for uncovering
exculpatory evidence. A criticism of the second prong of the duty would be
that simply by incorporating the word “existence,” the duty becomes too
vague, which places too much of a burden on the prosecutor and the
government’s resources, given the breadth of scenarios where a prosecutor
may suspect covered information “exists.” Further, the prosecutor’s
subjective belief regarding existence or lack thereof of exculpatory evidence
could render many appeals questioning not only what the prosecutor
absolutely knew, but also what he was open-endedly required to ascertain,
regardless of if any information may exist which is exculpatory. Imposition
of such a duty may be too broad to require of the government advocate.
172
173
174
175
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Moreover, this portion of the statute does not appear to give clear guidance
to the prosecutor who may be well-meaning in his attempt to abide by it; his
duty to “chase down” exculpatory “leads” could be too encompassing when
truly scrutinizing the proposed language.
3. Timing
Under current Supreme Court case law, timing of disclosures has
not been addressed with specificity.176 Rather, timing guidance is offered by
sources such as the ABA Model Rules, which propose “timely”
disclosure;177 the Jencks Act and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, both of
which restrain the release of witness statements until after the witness has
testified in trial;178 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, which requires
prompt disclosure of requested discovery material and continual duty to
disclose where requested material has not yet been produced;179 and the
USAM, which advocates for prompt disclosure of exculpatory information
and reasonable timeliness of disclosure of impeachment information before
trial, so long as the prosecutor “balance[es] the goals of early disclosure
against other significant interests,” such as witness security and national
security.180 Some district and state courts, however, have adopted their own
rules with regard to timing.181 For instance, some courts apply a standard
that disclosure must be made immediately, subject to timing restrictions by
the Jencks Act,182 while others use a measure of prejudice as a standard—
that so long as disclosure has been given in time for the defendant to
effectively use it at trial, no due process violation has occurred.183 Yet
FIDOE imposes the most specifically-rigorous timing requirements of any
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See Schimpff, supra note 107, at 1736.
See supra notes 109–13 and accompanying text.
178
See supra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
179
See supra notes 121, 122 and accompanying text.
180
See supra notes 128–31 and accompanying text.
181
See, e.g., United States v. Snell, 899 F. Supp. 17, 19 (D. Mass. 1995) (citing a local rule providing
for automatic discovery).
182
E.g., id. (“[The applicable local rule] is quite clear, and appropriately melds the concerns of the
Jencks act and Brady v. Maryland. If the evidence at issue is conceded to be Brady material, then it must
be turned over immediately, unless the Government meets the requirements for exempting [or delaying]
the information from disclosure . . . namely, [that it] would be detrimental to the interests of justice.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
183
See, e.g., Moreno v. Commonwealth, 392 S.E.2d 836, 842 (Va. Ct. App. 1990) (“Late disclosure
does not take on constitutional proportions unless an accused is prejudiced by the discovery violations
depriving him of a fair trial. So long as exculpatory evidence is obtained in time that it can be used
effectively by the defendant, and there is no showing that an accused has been prejudiced, there is no due
process violation . . . . It is the defendant’s ability to utilize the evidence at trial, and not the timing of the
disclosure, that is determinative of prejudice.”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Coppa, 267
F.3d 132, 146 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A]s a general rule, Brady and its progeny do not require immediate
disclosure of all exculpatory and impeachment material upon request by a defendant . . . the time
required for the effective use of a particular item of evidence will depend on the materiality of that
evidence . . . [and] the particular circumstances of the case.”).
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sources informing the disclosure duty to date,184 and adds some strong
safeguards for defendants along with it.185
Section 2(c) of the proposed statute would require disclosure of
covered information (1) “without delay after arraignment and before the
entry of any guilty plea,”186 and (2) continually, such that if covered
information “is not known on the date of the initial disclosure,” then “as
soon as is reasonably practicable” upon such information becoming known,
regardless of whether the defendant entered or agreed to enter a guilty
plea.187 That disclosure timing is initially enforced upon arraignment,
without delay, means that a prosecutor may not withhold covered
information known to him for any appreciable length of time beyond
arraignment. Such a standard appears highly protective of a defendant’s due
process rights, especially in comparison to the mere prejudice standard some
courts apply;188 the prejudice standard thus appears more beneficial to the
prosecution, while the proposed standard appears highly beneficial to the
defense.
Further, in contrast to the guidance of the USAM,189 the proposed
rule initially requires the prosecutor to disclose covered information
irrespective of consideration of witness security or national security190—but
does provide for the ability for the United States to delay release of the
information by filing a motion for protective order of it191 when such
information is solely for impeachment purposes;192 when the potential
witness is not likely already known to the defendant;193 and when the
184
See generally Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2(c) (2012)
(providing for timing of disclosure “without delay” after arraignment or continually, whenever
exculpatory evidence becomes known to the prosecution team).
185
See generally id. (posing timing requirements beneficial to a defendant and clarifying that the
disclosure duty extends throughout the life of the criminal proceeding and beyond, even if defendant
accepts a plea deal).
186
Id. § 2(c)(1).
187
Id. § 2(c)(2).
188
See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
189
See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text.
190
See S. 2197 §§ 2(c)(1), (c)(2); see also id. § 2(d)(1) (stating that disclosure requirements “shall
apply notwithstanding [the Jencks Act] or any other provision of law”). However, FIDOE provides an
exception to disclosure for designated “classified information,” as determined by the Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA), and such classified information would implicate national
security. See id. § 2(d)(2). CIPA defines “classified information” as “any information or material that
has been determined by the United States Government pursuant to an Executive order, statute, or
regulation, to require protection against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security and any
restricted data, as defined in . . . the Atomic Energy Act . . . .” Classified Information Procedures Act § 1,
18 U.S.C. App. 3 (2012). Because such classified information requires a determination under CIPA
before a prosecutor can withhold it, FIDOE could also constrain a prosecutor’s discretion to determine
whether favorable evidence would impact “national security” as currently appears permitted. See supra
notes 130–33 and accompanying text. However, the interaction between FIDOE’s disclosure
requirements and items that expressly concern “national security,” when designated under CIPA, is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
191
S. 2197 § 2(e)(2); see also id. § 2(e)(1).
192
Id. § 2(e)(1)(A).
193
Id. § 2(e)(1)(B)(i).
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disclosure could present a threat to the safety of the witness or of any other
person194 —which could be reasonably interpreted to account for national
security. This narrow stipulation for supply of protective orders and the
requirement of filing of a motion with the court, however, diminishes the
prosecutor’s ability to act with his own discretion with regard to matters of
witness and national security.
Additionally, it is notable that initial disclosure duty is imposed
even when the defendant plans to enter or has entered a guilty plea.195
Because a defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence is founded on his
constitutional right to a fair trial,196 and in theory, entry of a guilty plea
suggests the defendant is acknowledging his guilt, some courts do not hold
that a disclosure duty exists to avoid constitutional error in the pre-plea
context.197 A majority of courts, however, do find that a prosecutor has a
pre-plea duty to disclose Brady material.198 Therefore, it is evident that
FIDOE would resolve this division of authorities in the plea context and
require disclosure irrespective of negotiated plea agreements.
Furthermore, the construction of the second FIDOE timing
provision essentially requires any newly-discovered covered information to
be proffered to the defense during the life of the criminal prosecution and
even beyond.199 Under the second timing provision, disclosure of covered
information not known at any previous point in time must be disclosed
“upon the existence [of it] becoming known . . . . “200 Such phrasing,
unencumbered by any further qualifiers or limitations, supplies open-ended
authority to induce the Executive agency to produce the covered information
continually, which appears to include any point in time beyond conviction at
trial and beyond sentencing.201 Because a defendant’s due process right to
exculpatory evidence is fundamentally intended to supply a fair trial,202 in
providing for disclosure of evidence which becomes known to the Executive
agency after a trial, FIDOE provides an extension of protections beyond
those which have been constitutionally imposed. Otherwise, courts are
currently “all over the board” as to whether disclosure of exculpatory

194

Id. § 2(e)(1)(B)(ii).
Id. § 2(c)(2).
196
See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
197
Daniel Conte, Swept Under the Rug: The Brady Disclosure Obligation in A Pre-Plea Context, 17
SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 74, 83–84, 86–87 (2012).
198
Id. at 87.
199
See S. 2197 § 2(c)(2).
200
Id.
201
See id. Recall that the definition of “covered information” includes favorable evidence which may
impact determination of guilt, preliminary court matters, or sentencing; the interpretation that covered
information must be produced even beyond trial and sentencing does not appear to conflict with the
definition of covered information. See supra notes 153–60 and accompanying text; see also supra Part
III.A.1.
202
See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
195
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information is necessary upon conviction by a jury.203 Thus, FIDOE would
resolve this question, providing for greater protections for a defendant by
expressly extending disclosure requirements beyond his trial conviction.
4. Relationship to the Jencks Act & Protective Orders
Of significance to the passage of FIDOE in its current form, the
duty to disclose the favorable evidence “without delay” 204 under the FIDOE
timing provisions will apply under § 2(d) “notwithstanding section
3500(a)”205—meaning that FIDOE acknowledges its favorable evidence
disclosure timing requirements may conflict with Jencks Act stipulations,
and except for the possible pursuit of a protective order,206 FIDOE appears
to intend to implement timing duties to trump Jencks Act timing
constraints.207 While expressly addressing the proposed timing conflict with
the Jencks Act as FIDOE does, this language would not necessarily create a
seamless relationship between the two laws.
Under the Jencks Act, once a government witness has testified on
direct examination—but no sooner—the defendant may move for the court
to order production of that witness’ prior statements for examination and use
by the defense with regard to related subject matter.208 While in practice,
the Jencks Act assists a defendant by providing opportunity to unearth
witness credibility and impeachment material,209 it was nonetheless enacted
in part to protect a witness from the harassment, intimidation, and tampering
which may flow from earlier disclosure of his identity and statements.210
Thus, with the proposed FIDOE language requiring disclosure without
delay, despite the requirements of the Jencks Act, the Jencks Act and
FIDOE appear to work at philosophical odds with one another; on the one
hand, the former works to constrain the release of information, to protect a
witness and prevent witness tampering, while on the other hand, the latter
would attempt to broaden the defendant’s immediate right to exculpatory
material.
Yet two items may soften FIDOE’s potential philosophical conflict
with the protections of the Jencks Act. Foremost, disclosure of any
evidence under FIDOE necessarily must initially turn on whether that
evidence is “covered information” as defined by § 2(b).211 Thus, a
203

Brendan Max, The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Discovered After Trial, 94 ILL. B.J.
138, 140 (2006).
204
S. 2197 § 2(c)(2).
205
Id. § 2(d)(1).
206
See supra notes 190–94 and accompanying text.
207
See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
208
See supra notes 115–18 and accompanying text.
209
See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
210
See supra notes 115–17 and accompanying text.
211
See supra notes 153–60 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A.1.
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prosecutor in possession of a witness statement should continue to comply
with timing constraints of the Jencks Act unless for some reason that
witness statement has itself produced covered favorable evidence. A
possible scenario whereby a government witness statement produces
favorable evidence could be one in which an individual initially poses a
story which corroborates a defendant’s alibi, but who later recants to proffer
a different statement that aids the prosecution. Such opposing statements
would be “covered” because the original statement is exculpatory, and
moreover, the inconsistency of the two statements is impeaching. In
contrast, where a government witness had always held firm on his statement
that aids the prosecution, such a statement would not be “covered
information” as defined by FIDOE and thus need not be produced “without
delay.” Thus, the government witness whose statements could not be
deemed covered information under FIDOE, and who ultimately appears
during trial, will be protected by the Jencks Act and will only have his
statements produced after his testimony on direct examination is given.
The second area worth examining which could soften FIDOE’s
potential philosophical conflict with the Jencks Act is that upon motion of
the United States, § 2(e) provides for court protective orders which delay
disclosure of the release of even covered information212 when (1) it appears
that the value of such covered information would be solely as a basis to
impeach the witness,213 and (2) the government establishes a reasonable
basis to believe that the identity of the witness is not already known to the
defendant and (3) disclosure of the covered information would pose a threat
to the safety of the potential witness.214 This provision of FIDOE seems on
its face an attempt to align with the protective philosophy of the Jencks Act
in that it allows the government to guard the safety of its witness—but in
scrutinizing it, appears a mere token acknowledgment of Jencks rationale,
falling operationally short of actual witness protection.
First, the protective order provision places a heavier burden on the
prosecution for initial proof, contrary to the automatic protection provided a
witness under the Jencks Act. Next, because of the use of the conjunctive
“and” in two locations of the provision, all three conditions must be met
before a court may issue a protective order. Further, on the outset, § 2(e) is
confusing because it seems so restrictive. For instance, the first prong of the
provision suggests that whenever covered information would provide more
than a mere basis for impeachment, a protective order will not follow.
Thus, for example, where the covered information is merely the fact that a
government witness was given a deal in exchange for testimony, thus solely
impeaching his credibility, the first prong would be met. However, where
212
213
214

Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, S. 2197, 112th Cong. § 2(e)(2) (2012).
Id. § 2 (e)(1)(A).
Id. § 2(e)(1)(B).
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statements by a government witness were made which tend to exculpate the
defendant, meeting the definition of “covered information,” the statements
of the witness would never be protectable by court order. Next, even if the
first prong is met, under the second prong of the provision, if any of two
additional conditions are not met—if either the witness is already known or
the witness’ safety is not threatened—again, a protective order against the
release of covered information would then be unavailable. Moreover, from
a practical standpoint, it would likely be difficult for the government to
establish the required “reasonable basis to believe” that the safety of a
witness could be threatened.
Therefore, it appears that overall, while the Jencks Act would not be
repealed, it would be marginalized by enactment of FIDOE in its current
form. The Jencks Act would only continue to be clearly useful in instances
where a witness has never proffered a statement favorable to the defense
which could be construed as covered information, which indeed would
likely be most instances. However, FIDOE otherwise appears to expand a
defendant’s rights at the expense of Jencks Act protections of witnesses
against such ills as potential intimidation or witness tampering before trial.
As for its protective orders provision, FIDOE appears to be too
operationally restrictive to provide much in the way of meaningful support
from which a protective order would ever materialize.
5. Noncompliance and its Remedies and the Defendant’s Costs
FIDOE provides motivation for a prosecutor’s compliance with his
disclosure duties under the Act.215 First, unlike the current disclosure
regime, FIDOE provides procedural safeguards under § 2(g) when
noncompliance is suspected as to the duty to disclose and timing
provisions.216 Prior to entry of a judgment, a defendant can file a motion or
the court may address such a failure sua sponte if there is mere “reason to
believe” the failure exists.217 A key aspect of this procedural measure which
is beneficial to the defense is that, seemingly rather than requiring the
defendant to demonstrate his basis for a claim of noncompliance, the
government must “show cause why the court should not find the United
States is not in compliance” of either its disclosure duties under § 2(b) or its
timing duties under § 2(c) of the Act.218
However, a critique of this proposed approach would be that the
defense would not need much indication of noncompliance before filing its
motion, since the heavier burden is carried by the prosecution, which could
thus lead to filings of superfluous motions. In addition, due to the
215
216
217
218
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prosecutor’s obligation to show cause or risk being found noncomplying,
this provision could be abused by defense attorneys to compel information
or evidence from the prosecution team which may not have been covered
information reasonably appearing favorable to the defendant. Therefore, a
possible effect of such abuses could be that the prosecutor-advocate will be
induced to reveal more information than had been intended, potentially
jeopardizing the government’s strategy.
The next motivating factor for compliance is found under § 2(h),
which expressly provides remedies when a violation has been found as to
the disclosure of covered information, either with respect to outright
nondisclosure or to delayed timing.219 When noncompliance is found, in
fashioning a remedy, the court must weigh several factors, which include the
seriousness of the violation; the impact of the violation on the proceeding;
and whether the violation was the result of innocent error, negligence,
recklessness, or knowing conduct.220 The remedy that the court may order
could include postponement or adjournment of the proceedings; exclusion or
limitations on evidence or testimony; an order of a new trial; dismissal; or
any other remedy the court finds appropriate. 221 Although the remedies
available for a court to draw upon in the event of noncompliance are not
unordinary, simple enumeration of the potential remedies and factors the
court might weigh to assess a remedy would likely provide further
encouragement for better compliance.
A final motivating factor an individual prosecutor, and the Executive
agency, will likely consider when acting toward compliance with disclosure
and timing requirements is that, should the court find a violation, the court may
order the United States to pay the reasonable attorney’s fees of the defendant as
provided by § 2(h)(2).222 This remedy is available whenever the court finds
that the violation was due to negligence, recklessness, or knowing conduct.223
As with the other remedies expressed under § 2(h), simple enumeration
addressing the defendant’s costs in the event of noncompliance would likely
encourage better compliance, especially in light of the relatively low threshold
of “negligence” sufficing to invoke this provision. In addition, more so than
the remedies aimed at court proceedings listed under § 2(h)(1)(B), in supplying
the possibility that the government would have to pay the defendant’s
attorney’s fee, § 2(h)(2) would especially motivate the Executive agency to
promote compliance by its prosecutors, which could in turn lead to more
rigorous training procedures and potentially to a higher ethical caliber for
personnel over time.
219
220
221
222
223
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6. Standard of Review
The final notable aspect of FIDOE to be analyzed by this Comment
is the fact that, under § 2(i), in an appellate proceeding initiated by a
defendant, a reviewing court may not find the error resulting from
noncompliance harmless unless the government can demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt “that the error did not contribute to the verdict
obtained.”224 Such a standard places a huge burden upon the prosecutor,
assigning him the very difficult task of proving a negative, to an incredibly
high standard.
It would clearly be difficult to demonstrate that
nondisclosure of covered information did not in some way contribute to a
guilty verdict obtained. This burden on review obviously provides further
incentive for continual and thorough compliance throughout the progression
of a case. Thus, § 2(i) of FIDOE generally offers a defendant a great level
of protection throughout the progress of a case as well as when
nondisclosure of favorable information is an issue for review by an appellate
court.
B. Application of FIDOE to the Stevens Case Illustrates its Desired Results
It is obvious how well suited FIDOE is to address the exculpatory
evidence disclosure failings of a case like Stevens.225 Even items such as Bill
Allen’s morphing story and conflicting testimony, as well as the impeachment
information regarding Bambi Tyree,226 would have clearly fallen under the
umbrella of “covered information” deemed reasonably favorable to the
defendant by FIDOE § 2(a), and a prosecutor would not have needed to ponder
“probabilities” of whether such information would have been helpful to
Stevens or not before his obligation to hand it over would kick in.227
Further, the disorganization and lack of consistent procedures
present in the Stevens Case—and the subsequent blame-game that resulted
from it—would not have been cultivated under the FIDOE regime, since at
all points up to and including the trial, disclosure responsibilities would
have rested on any member of the “prosecution team.”228 Clearly, even for
the magnitude of a case like Stevens, this would have required all involved
prosecutors and any FBI agents to know and understand their
responsibilities—which would have led to promulgation from the top down
of a thorough and systematic manner of rooting out and processing
224

Id. § 2(i) (emphasis added).
See supra Part II.A (examining the exculpatory evidence issues involved in the Stevens Case).
See supra notes 45–58 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of Allen’s story and
conflicts in testimony and his involvement with the 15-year-old prostitute, Bambi Tyree).
227
See supra notes 153–60 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A.1 (examining “covered
information” and the “reasonable favorability” standard of FIDOE versus the “reasonable probability”
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228
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meaning of the “prosecution team”).
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exculpatory evidence—and no acceptance of after-the-fact excuses for
prosecution-team-member botches. Under FIDOE, too, it appears that
anyone participating on behalf of, under the control of, or participating
jointly with the “Executive agency” in an investigation would have held
exculpatory evidence responsibilities;229 therefore, as an informant, Bill
Allen himself may have needed to be trained to understand what “favorable
evidence” consisted of and to deliberately reflect upon, recollect, and report
circumstances which met the definition, including in his dealings
surrounding the Torricelli note.230
With respect to the FIDOE timing standard, it is obvious that at
several points along the way and even during the Stevens trial, the
prosecution team would have held an affirmative duty to disclose favorable
information, without hesitation.231 Thus, even for a relatively convoluted
state of affairs, such as at the point the prosecution recognized Bill Allen’s
morphing story—in the final days counting down to the trial, and again
immediately after the “cover your ass” testimony Allen gave on the
stand232—those prosecutors who identified the discrepancy would have held
a positive duty to report it “without delay.” Further, under the timing
requirement of FIDOE, information coming to light after Stevens’s
conviction, such as the interview documents revealing Allen’s inability to
recall speaking to Persons whatsoever,233 would have been required
disclosures at any later time upon its discovery.234
Finally, because FIDOE expressly addresses procedures for
suspected noncompliance that place a burden on the prosecution,235 and
because of the remedies available in the event of noncompliance—including
payment of the defense attorney’s fees whenever a violation is due to even
mere negligence236—the Stevens prosecutors would have naturally felt
compelled to comply with FIDOE requirements at all times. Such an added
sense of accountability would have likely led to stronger management over
the prosecution team, better documentation and organization of evidence,
and a systematic method for ferreting out exculpatory evidence favorable to
Stevens’s defense.237
229

See supra notes 163–70 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A.1 (examining which
individuals may be considered to be participants in an investigation executed by the Executive agency).
230
See supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text (discussing the story of the Torricelli note).
231
See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text (examining FIDOE’s timing requirements).
232
See supra notes 45–55 and accompanying text (discussing the evolution of Allen’s story and
conflicts in testimony).
233
See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
234
See supra notes 186–88 and accompanying text (examining FIDOE’s timing requirements).
235
See supra notes 215–18 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.A.5 (examining the
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236
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Some glaring issues should be addressed before passage of FIDOE.
First, the overarching definition of the “prosecution team” may implicate
such a wide range of responsible players that noncompliance by any one of
them may be all but inevitable.238 Lawmakers should recognize the
potential consequences of this broad definition and instead consider limiting
the prosecution’s accountability toward the noncompliant acts of individuals
who have only attenuated dealings with the prosecution or an investigation,
such as participants who are not government employees. Second,
lawmakers should expressly confront FIDOE’s § 2(d) philosophical conflict
with the Jencks Act, in light of Jencks’s protective purpose,239 and instead
incorporate a means of preserving its protections for witnesses.
Next, under § 2(g), lawmakers should reconsider the available
action for the defense to file a motion when vaguely suspecting missing
disclosable exculpatory evidence, which then requires the prosecution to
show cause not to be found noncompliant.240 A proffered step to rein in
potential frivolous filings and spread the burden could be a requirement for
the defense to first outline its basis for the claim and make a more specific
demand upon the prosecution. Further, under FIDOE’s § 2(i) standard of
review provision, the notion of using a reasonable doubt standard in the
context of proving the negative implication that an error “did not contribute”
to the verdict ultimately obtained creates too heavy of a burden for the
prosecution to carry,241 and could clearly result in guilty defendants walking
free, even in the face of trivial and unintended disclosure mistakes.
Lawmakers should thus address this provision either by lessening the
beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard to “clear and convincing,” or
alternatively, shifting the burden to the defense by using a “more likely than
not” standard.
Finally, adding a provision to FIDOE which provides for a system
similar to “open-file discovery”—whereby all evidence known to the
government is available to the defendant242—but beyond the conclusion of a
case by trial or acceptance of a plea deal, may further influence full
compliance, while allowing the prosecution to better preserve its basis of
strategy for the case. Adding such a layer of protection could also better
perfect our criminal justice system, ensuring that innocent or less-culpable
criminal defendants are given the most comprehensive access possible to
evidence that may later exonerate them.

238
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V. CONCLUSION
The Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act takes hearty aim at a
well-meaning but flawed system. The Stevens Case has highlighted the
potential for error under the current disclosure regime and reinvigorated the
debate over what is fair to a criminal defendant. Yet it is not difficult to
imagine the many other criminal cases adjudicated throughout our nation
through the years—whose defendants lacked the resources of an accused
senator, and whose defendants did not receive the public notoriety of a
powerful elected official—in which due process violations resulted from
nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence. And even when error has been
acknowledged, such lower-profile cases by and large have not served as a
catalyst for major progressive change to the system. Thus, given the
specific issues of the Stevens Case and their subsequent thorough treatment
by the Department of Justice, the independent investigator appointed by
Judge Sullivan, and various media sources and legal scholarship, Stevens
provides for an unparalleled opportunity to address the flaws of the current
disclosure guidance regime. We must seize upon the debacle of Stevens in
order to refine the system, for the benefit of all citizens who would be
subjected to an unfair chance against the federal government.
Though some of its questionable aspects have been discussed and
recommendations have been made within this Comment, FIDOE as drafted
provides a good start to overhaul the present disclosure-guidance scheme. A
critical analysis of FIDOE indeed demonstrates major improvements over
the current system to the rights of criminal defendants. And there is
probably no better arena to push for such positive change than through
actual legislation—formulated by and amongst the friends and colleagues
personally impacted by the case of Senator Stevens. Thus, the conditions
are ripe to repair the flawed regime in a manner that will provide needed
safeguards for criminal defendants from all walks of life.
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